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AMERICAN

JUDICATURE SOCIETY

interest which would keep our judicial system
from rendering to all who may apply, speedy
and equal justice.
What Bar and Bench Can Do
The press could have offered no better
representative, or champion, than James P.
Kirby. Without denying many of the charges
leveled at newspapers Mr. Kirby pointed out
that the worst faults complained of could be
cured at a single stroke by judges who had
the courage and good taste to use the power
inherent in their office. Bar associations, too,
could do much to remedy existing weaknesses
in the profession in and out of court. He
spoke of the Hall-Mills case, where the judge
sat with batteries of cameras to right and to
left, while he had permitted installation in the
courthouse of a telegraph instrument which
served one hundred 'and twenty reporters at
the rate of 20,000 words an hour. The judge
could have put a curb on the unholy sensationalism of that trial if he had wanted to. He

told of magistrates who even asked reporters
what questions to ask in order to make "good
copy." He told of knowing prosecutors who,
for campaign purposes, will do anything to
give reporters sensational stories. "May I submit that I could give the names of lawyers
who, before- drawing a pleading, have called
me and other newspaper men and volunteered
to so draft a pleading as to make good newspaper copy. I do'not know what the American Bar Association's code of ethics says on
this subject."
As for press influence Mr. Kirby told of
the printing of a glowing editorial commending a Cleveland policeman for killing a man,
and before thc day of publication was ovei
that officer shot and killed as a suspect an
innocent employe of the same paper.
"I think it would be a hardy newspaper man
who would venture to criticize a judge who
had the courage to lay down a rule which
would prohibit some of the things I have
personally seen happen in court rooms."

A Foundation for Procedural Reform
Bill Drafted by Prof. Hugh E. Willis and Approved by Indiana Bar Association First to Follow Method Successful in England's Reform.
Only two or three years ago it was possible
to say that in spite of a generation of bar
agitation the essential reformation of pleading
and trial practice had virtually arrived at
stalemate. Since then notable things have developed. Broad rule-making power has been
conferred on certain supreme courts, notably
those in Washington and Wisconsin.
In
Michigan the supreme court's constitutional
power has been exercised liberally through
the efforts of the state bar association awl
with the aid of the Legal Research Council
of University of Michigan Law School. In
Connecticut, Massachusetts, California, Texas
and elsewhere the judicial councils have secured adoption of specific acts of considerable
importance.
It would now seem fair to hold that while
present influences appear certain to work out
substantial reforms in many states it is yet
possible to expedite this reform with no loss
of judicial expertness in any state where the
bar will give support to a real reform act.
In explanation it should be said that England's success in modernizing pleadings and
practice after a prolonged struggle came under the judicature acts, which created an expert body of judges and lawyers to advise the
supreme court as to needed changes in rules
Ordinarily reference to the English situation
stops here, and ignores what was even more

significant. Parliament not only created this
machinery, but at the same time enacted a
compact body of rules as a foundation for
progress. These rules extend in fifty-eight
sections from "form of action" and "summons"
to "effect of appeal." They form a sort of
constitution under which the rules adopted by
the supreme court provide the extended operative provisions.'
It is entirely clear that this mode swept the
ancient and unfit rules out of existence and
obligated the court, with the aid of the rules
committee, to proceed in a spirit of liberality
and sincere compliance with the nation's mandate.
It is conceded that in no state is there
situation precisely comparable to that of England's in 1870. But in most states there is
ground for dissatisfaction with practice acts
and codes that have permitted the growth of
pleadings and trial procedure which overemphasize contentiousness and stimulate the
competitive instincts of counsel. And in most
states we developed a strictly American trial
procedure in jury cases which largely eliminated the judge as a responsible factor.2
1 This enacted "schedule of rules" was published
in full in this Journal, Vol. iv, No. 4. p. 115.
2 In an argument for the plan involved in the
draft act which follows Professor Willis said:
"Code and common law pleading have had much
to do with making our legal procedure a game
through raising procedural instead of substantive
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The question may be said to be whether in
any state the bar is willing to accept the
leadership of the highest court, aided by a
council of trial judges and lawyers, in making
our procedure conform more closely to practical needs. In any such state the way is
open. An act of legislature may confer on
the supreme court full rule-making powers
(meaning by that the power to abrogate statutory rules as new ones are promulgated), create the advisory council, as has been done in
Wisconsin and is proposed to be done in
Missouri, and also define in general precepts
the course of reform. This appears to be
the appropriate plan for progressives to aim at.
It is the opinion of the writer that such an
advisory council, or rules committee, should
not be conceived as filling the role of the
state judicial council as that role is now understood. There should be, in other words, a
judicial council charged with the broadest advisory powers, empowered to obtain all needed
data as to judicial administration throughout
the state. No conflicts would occur with the
rules committee. The judicial council would
be absolved from drafting rules of practice
and procedure and would devote itself to
administrative problems and advising the legislature as to needed acts outside of the field
of court rules.
Of course a single body could cover both
fields, but presumably with less success than
two bodies with personnel chosen for these
different functions. There would also be,
with two such groups, a distribution of responsibility and honors, a larger body of
voluntary workers, and an easier load.
With this cursory attempt to present a situation and suggest the best course it is timely
to present steps in this direction which have
been taken in Indiana. Prof. Flugh E. Willis,
of the Indiana State University School of
Law, has obtained full approval of a suitable
bill by the State Bar Association's committee
on jurisprudence and law reform. It is published below in this form. The Association
itself, after thorough discussion, approved of
law points. Notice pleading would do much to correct this defect in our present system. There is no
reason for any other requirement of pleading. All
that a litigant or an accused needs is notice suffleient to apprize him of the claim or charge
against him, and this is all that the court needs

before the beginning of the trial. The Issues can
better be fixed by the trial court itself as was done
by the praetors under the Roman law, and as is
done by masters or the Judge In England today.
"Attorney control over the conduct of cases also
has had a great deal to do with the litigation of
procedure. Attorneys are always partial. But one
of the best ways to obtain Justice is through some
Impartial judicial control. The only way of obtaining this is through the trial judge. It is the
business of attorneys to be partial. They are under

imperative duty of so being.
duty to be impartial.

Judges are under

Once in a while a court may

hae a partial judge, but his work can be corrected by a higher court, and it is better to have
once in a while a partial judge than never to have

the bill with the exception of the provisions
for notice pleading and the broad powers
given to the trial judge in sec. 2, par. v.
These are substantial matters but enactment
of the bill without them would mean a very
long step forward, one which may be taken
at the next term of legislature. The Indiana
State Bar Association has been making
strides in the past two or three years and
much may be expected of it in the future.
Proposed Procedural Act
An act to abolish the present and to provide a
new system of legal procedure for all the courts
of this state; authorizing the supreme court to
prescribe, promulgate, enforce and publish forms
and rules for the regulation of legal procedure;
providing for an advisory council, reporter and
employes; making appropriation for carrying out
the purposes of this act; and repealing all laws
in conflict therewith.
Be it enacted, etc.
Section 1. SUPREME COURT TO MAKE
RULES. The supreme court of this state shall
have the power to make, prescribe, promulgate
and enforce by rule from time to time and in
any manner, the forms of writs and all other
process; the mode and manner of framing and
filing proceedings, papers and pleadings; of giving notice, serving and returning writs and
process of all kinds; of giving, taking and obtaining evidence; drawing -up, entering and enrolling orders and the keeping of all other
records of the court; regulating costs; and generally to regulate and prescribe the entire procedure, including pleading, evidence, and practice, to be used in all actions, motions and proceedings, of whatever nature, in all the courts,
including the courts of appeal, of this state.
Separate rules shall be made for civil and for
criminal trial procedure.
Section 2. RULES OF LEGAL PROCEDURE. The rules of legal procedure in this state
shall be such rules as may thus be adopted by
the supreme court of this state; provided, that
(a) Simplification of Rules. In prescribing
such rules the Supreme Court shall have regard
to the simplification of the system of pleading,
evidence, practice, and procedure in said courts,
so as to promote a speedy determination of
litigation.
a chance to get impartiality into the courtroom.

The trial judge, therefore, should be clothed with
power to impanel the jury with proper safeguards;
with the power to examine witnesses; and in marriage, divorce, and probate eases, and in the case
of experts even to call witnesses.
"Attorneys are interested in these questions, but
clients are not interested in them. If attorneys
only were Interested, perhaps our system of legal
procedure might be said to be working all right,
but legal procedure is not for attorneys but for
clients. If society were asked to furnish gratuitously a game for attorneys to play for their own
amusement it would probably refuse to stand the
expense. Yet in actual result this Is more or less
what society is now actually doing. Other results
which follow are uncertainty, technicality, expense,
and delays.

Even if justice is finally obtained In

certain cases it is always at the expense of these
other results. In a great many cases in addition
to these results, justice even is not obtained."
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(b)
Pleading. All rules of pleading shall be
based upon the principle of giving notice of the
opposing claims of the respective parties, sufficient to apprise them and the court of the nature
thereof [notice pleading].
They shall not be
based on the principle of requiring a complete
allegation of all the ultimate facts which must
be proved at the trial in order to establish such
claims [issue or essential fact pleading]. The
term pleading as used in this act shall be understood to include affidavits, indictments and all
other papers filed or used in any legal proceeding except as evidence.
(c) Practice: Trial Court. Every step in
the trial of a case shall be taken under the direction and supervision of the court; and the judge
shall help to empanel the jury, shall elicit evidence by questions to witnesses, shall instruct the
jury upon the law, and otherwise control the conduct of the case. The judge shall have power
to select, summon, and place on the stand witnesses not called by the parties. Experts shall be
called by the court instead of by litigants, either
on the court's own initiative or on request of a
litigant; and the expense thereof shall be included as a part of the trial cost.
(d) Practice: Supreme and Appellate Courts.
No case shall be reversed for a violation of
rules of court, or any other technicality, or ever
remanded for a complete new trial if the first
trial satisfies constitutional requirements, but the
supreme court shall, where practical, always render final judgment, and to that end it is empowered to correct any prejudicial errors of the
trial court, whether of procedure or of substantive law, and to certify to the trial court for
trial any unsettled question of fact on which
it has not power to take evidence.
(e) Rules to Be Not Inconsistent with Act.
All the rules so adopted by the supreme court
shall not be inconsistent with any of the terms.
of this act or with the constitution of the state
or of the United States.
(f) FirstRules. The rules of legal procedure
in force at the present time, whether statutory or
common law rules, are hereby repealed as mandatory rules and are constituted and declared to
be operative as the first rules of court for the
appropriate courts of this state.
Section 3. EFFECT OF RULES. All rules of
court formulated pursuant to this act, except as
required by this act or the constitution of the
state, shall, as to the courts, be directory and not
mandatory.
Section 4. DECISIONS NOT PRECEDENTS.
A decision by any court on a point of procedure,

whether a point of pleading, evidence, practice
or any other procedural matter, shall never be
regarded as a binding precedent for the decision
of a procedural point in a later case. The question whether any point is procedural or substantive shall itself be regarded as procedural.
Section 5. ADVISORY COUNCIL. To assist
the supreme court in the revision of the rules of
court there is hereby created as a permanent
tribunal an advisory council to be composed of
the attorney general of the state, the chairman
of the judiciary committee of the senate, the
chairman of the judiciary committee of the house
of representatives, two circuit judges of the state
to be appointed by the governor, and the president and vice-president of the Indiana Bar Association. Said council shall be advisory only
and shall have no power to change any of the
rules. The members of the council shall serve
without pay but shall be allowed their necessary
expenses.
Section 6. REPORTER, etc. The supreme
court is authorized to employ a reporter, an expert in the law of legal procedure, whose duty
it shall be to study the present rules of legal
procedure and to prepare and report to said
council and courts rules designed to carry out
the purposes of this act. Such court is also
authorized to employ such clerical and stenographical assistance and to purchase such supplies as may be necessary; and to fix the compensation and to provide for the expenses of employes and for the said reporter.
Section 7. PUBLICATION OF RULES. The
supreme court is hereby given authority to contract for the publication of the rules of court.
Section 8. APPROPRIATION. There is hereby appropriated out of any money in the general fund of the state treasury not otherwise
appropriated

. . . for the purpose of carry-

ing out the provisions of this act, to be paid
out on the order of such courts.
Section 9. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. If
an phrase, sentence or provision of this act
is unconstitutional it shall not affect the constitutionality of the remaining provisions of the
act.
Section 10. REPEAL. All laws or parts of
laws inconsistent with this act are hereby repealed. When and as the rules of court herein
authorized shall be promulgated, all rules in conflict therewith shall be and become of no further
force and effect.
Section 11. TIME OF TAKING EFFECT.
This act shall be in force and effect from and
after

Every lawyer knows that the continual reversal of judgments,
the sending of parties to a litigation to and fro between the trial
and appellate courts, has become a disgrace to the administration
of justice in the United States. Everybody knows that the vast
network of highly technical rules of evidence and procedure which
prevails in this country serves to tangle justice in the name of form.
It is a disgrace to our profession. It is a disgrace to our law, and
a discredit to our institutions.-Elihu Root.

